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Teaching Philosophy:
Course Requirements and Bloom's Taxonomy

Gregg Strawbridge, Ph.D.
Pastor of All Saints' Presbyterian Church, Lancaster, PA www.allsaintspresbyterian.com 


In less formal settings or even past days when philosophy was the passion of gadflies, monks, lens grinders, statesmen, and bishops, certain pedagogical mandates were not needed. However, the contemporary mode of learning philosophy, usually in the college classroom, necessitates accountability via course requirements. Unfortunately, conditions for the more pure development of philosophy are seldom present in our American educational system. Consequently, most undergraduate students are quite the pedagogical analysts, researching in detail the exact nature of the means of academic accountability. Only when institutional and certification constraints are low and previous student experience and motivation abundant are course requirements a vestigial organ. Rarely in the higher education scenario do all four of the above conjoin, if ever. If they occur frequently in your institution, diligently pursue tenure!

Requirements, in my use of the term, refers to all work which can be specified by the instructor for the successful completion of the course, including exams. Requirements serve at least three important purposes: (a) course requirements may provide a means of relatively objective evaluation; (b) course requirements may provide a means of observable demonstration of the outcomes of learning and, (c) if carefully planned, course requirements may provide a vital means of learning. Therefore, an essential task of the thoughtful instructor is to develop course requirements which are more than pedagogical hoops through which students should jump. To do this, then, is to consider an aspect of curriculum development as it applies to the pedagogical context of philosophy. It is the intersection of education and philosophy.

This year there are likely hundreds of fresh graduate students preparing to teach their first PHI 101 course. As they do so, grasping this intersect of the educational processes and the content of philosophy may serve as a Form (though not from Plato's world ideas), giving a pattern to their preparation.

LEARNING JARGON

The analysts of educational processes have, for quite some time, recognized three domains in which learning takes place and to which educational objectives apply: the cognitive domain, the affective (emotional) domain, and the psychomotor (physical) domain. The cognitive domain focuses on reasoning and general intellectual processes. The affective domain involves valuing and the emotive dimension. By the psychomotor domain, what is meant is the learning which is focused on physical skills such as handwriting, tennis swing, musical instrument technique, etc. While no rigid dichotomies are ultimately defensible, this set of categories has usefully served educators in a large variety of disciplines.

Philosophy, as a formal subject of study, is manifestly more concerned about the cognitive domain of learning than the affective, or psychomotor, although there is an important affective concern in all education. Namely, we want students to value the discipline of philosophy and to cultivate an enjoyment in learning it. A. N. Whitehead says, "The justification for a university is that it preserves the connection between knowledge and the zest of life, by uniting the young and the old in the imaginative consideration of learning."(1) (p. 139). In what follows, I will restrict myself to reflection on the cognitive domain, since it is the prima facie focus of philosophy.
 

PHILOSOPHY IN FULL BLOOM

In 1956, Bloom, et al. contributed immensely to the subject of cognitive and affective learning by producing useful taxonomies of educational goals and objectives for the

domains.(2) Bloom's taxonomy in the cognitive area is quite popular and useful today. The structure of the taxonomy is to make distinctions between various tasks in learning: one first gains knowledge, then comprehension, then ascends through application, analysis, and synthesis, to the upward call of evaluation. The following is a brief description of the terms in the taxonomy.(3)

Knowledge

Knowledge in this context is defined as remembering material learned previously. It is the recall of facts. It involves knowing such things as dates and definitions of terms.

Comprehension

Comprehension moves beyond mere isolated information to a broader grasp of the meaning of ideas. It is understanding or apprehension such that the individual knows what is being communicated and can make use of the ideas being communicated. Three aspects may be considered: (a) Translation, or accurately paraphrasing; (b) interpretation or summarization; and (c) extrapolation, or extending information beyond the given data to see its relationships with other information.

Application

Application involves using learned material in other situations. It is abstracting the general ideas, rules of procedures, or generalized methods for identification in another context.

Analysis

Analysis is the ability to break down learned material into its parts. It involves identification of the elements, relationships, organizational principles and the systematic arrangement and structure which make the material cohere.

Synthesis

Synthesis is reassembling the parts to form a new whole. It involves producing new material plans and abstract relations. This is a creative ability.

Evaluation

Evaluation is the highest level and subsumes the previous levels. Evaluation is part and parcel to the work of philosophy; it requires is judging material fully comprehended. Judgments may be based on internal criteria such as logical accuracy, consistency, and coherency, or external criteria such as the adequacy of the material to account for external facts.

Inherent in a taxonomy is that the higher levels involve elements of the lower ones. Thus, comprehension builds on knowledge; application builds on comprehension, etc. This hierarchical relationship is important to remember when formulating requirements. Assuming very low student exposure and experience in the formal subject of philosophy, basically, what is needed throughout the course are assignments which move through the taxonomy. We have probably all grappled with how to ensure the growth of students who say, "just tell me what I need to learn"--as though they could memorize the answer to a good essay question and regurgitate it for an "A." I am suggesting that the taxonomy can help break down complex educational tasks if we employ it in developing course requirements.

BLOOM IN THE CLASSROOM

Certain kinds of tasks seem to fit with certain cognitive levels better than others. For example, it is difficult to construct an objective format exam (matching, multiple choice, etc.) which is aimed at evaluation. Likewise it is difficult to require a paper which remains at the knowledge level. Now a suggested strategy, drawn inferentially from the taxonomy, is evident: make initial requirements, especially for the uninitiated, aim at the lower levels--knowledge and comprehension. Once students are competent at these lower levels, application and analysis may follow. Then in major assignments, such as final exams and papers, synthesis and evaluation may properly become the goal. I mean to suggest this more as a conceptual approach than a chronological sequence, though surely the final requirements of a philosophy course should involve more of the higher levels than the initial requirements.

When we distinguish the components of our requirements along the lines of the taxonomy, we also provide a good basis for grading essays and other more subjective assignments. It becomes clear why, "I don't like Socrtes," does not qualify as an evaluation. Any intelligent synthesis or evaluation must deal adequately with the knowledge, comprehension, and analysis levels. This removes some (certainly not all) of the subjective component in grading a students essays and papers. For most students, papers and essays are the most intimidating part of a college course. This speaks to the poor preparation which many students receive. However, rather than complain, we must develop strategies to attack and overcome these disadvantages and handicaps.

Steven Fishman suggests some ideas and procedures which aid the philosophy instructor in writing assignments: brainstorming, listing as many items as possible about a specific topic; mapping, putting a topic in the center of a page and connecting lines/branches to related ideas; and freewriting, rapidly composing without regard for structure or grammar.(4) These strategies were useful with the students to help them develop topics for inquiry, overcome the inadequacy often felt about written assignments and produce a written product. Fishman's suggestions highlight the application, synthesis and even evaluation end of the cognitive spectrum. More traditional strategies of outlines, note cards, preliminary drafts, etc. can follow these creative pre-writing strategies. When such strategies are not divorced from the knowledge/comprehension base, the result proves satisfactory on all accounts.

Not only in testing and written assignments is it possible to apply the hierarchy of cognitive categories, but also in reading. Laura Duhan has discussed reading primary philosophy texts on three levels, reading the texts three times.(5) Level one is "getting through the English sentences." Level two is discerning "patterns of reasoning and argumentation." Level three is understanding themes in the text. This is explained to the students by means of analogies--basketball and music. In basketball you first do the mechanics, then learn the rules and then strategize to win. In music, you first type the notes from the page, then learn the rhythm, and finally learn the harmonic structure. As a result of all three levels, full understanding results. Duhan's three levels seem to correspond with Bloom's knowledge, analysis, and comprehension. Though the last two are inverted leaving out application, Duhan observes that it could be argued that level three could precede two or be coincidental with it. This type of instruction in reading is increasingly necessary given the less and less stringent standards of admission in colleges and universities. Even apart from that, the literature of philosophy is among the most demanding on the reader. So instruction about reading assignments which incorporates movement up the Bloomian ladder will be more effective than a simple fiat, "read"(!). In doing this we will heed Whitehead's warning, "above all things we must beware of what I will call 'inert ideas'--that is to say, ideas that are merely received into the mind without being utilised, or tested, or thrown into fresh combinations."(6)

APPLICATION AND SYNTHESIS

Differentiating our cognitive demands is like being enlightened with those subtle distinctions between universals and particulars, the one and many, necessity and contingency, analytic and synthetic, a priori and a posteriori--definition leads to clarification, implication, and extrapolation. Aristotle (?) is reported to have said, "You have a much greater chance of abstracting on the universals from the target if you can see it." Philosophy instructors should consider the telos of their courses. With the goal in mind, the map to the end can more easily be charted. Developing effective course requirements probably will not save science and make room for religion, but it may aid deficient students and inexperienced instructors in the intersect of philosophy and education.
 

APPENDIX: PEDANTICALLY PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION

For those who want to make a list and check it twice, here are some clear and distinct steps toward synthesizing this to the lower level philosophy course setting. Thus, what follows is an all too rigid model for instructional design and course preparation: