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George Berkeley was born at Kilkenny, Ireland, on March 12, 1685. His academic career began in 1696 when he entered Kilkenny College. He went on to study at Trinity College, Dublin (1700) at age fifteen. In 1704 graduated with a B.A. to be later elected a fellow of Trinity in 1707, the year in which he wrote Philosophical Commentaries. In 1709 he published the Essay on Vision. In 1710 one of his two primary philosophical works, the Principles of Human Knowledge was published. The other, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous were published three years later in 1713. In 1721 De Motu was published and he returned to Dublin and Trinity College. In 1724 he was appointed Dean of Derry. In that same year he resigned from Trinity in order to found a college in Bermuda which never materialized. In 1728 he was married to Anne Forester. He visited America for about three years. In 1731 after being informed that the grant for the college he was seeking to found (St. Paul's) would not be paid, he returned to London. Another treatise was published 1732, Alciphron, an attack on contemporary free-thinking. In 1734 he was appointed Bishop of Cloyne (Ireland). He died in Oxford on January 14, 1753 (Armstrong, 1965, p. 6).

His philosophical themes foreshadowed many twentieth-century schools of thought. Berkeley gave attention to language and thought, words and signs, primary and secondary qualities, substance, universals and particulars, understanding and will, mind and other minds, causation and God (Engle, 1968, pp. 1-2). The primary purpose of this essay, however, is to summarize his arguments for his description of reality. Subsequent to that I shall provide a brief hypothetical dialogue between between Berkeley and another noteworthy metaphysician.

BERKELEY'S ARGUMENTS ON THE NATURE OF REALITY

The striking premise which Berkeley seeks to defend in the two main works is one which prima facie seems non-sensical; namely, that physical objects cannot exist unperceived. Beyond a more mild skeptical position which questions whether unperceived things exist, his radical position asserts that physical objects cannot exist unperceived. He argues that the position of the existence of unperceived objects involves a contradiction.

ARGUMENT ONE: OBJECTS ARE IDEAS

The opening sections of the Principles (Sections 1-7) contain his initial argument. Armstrong (1965) outlines it as follows:

(1) Sensible qualities of objects are nothing but "ideas" in the mind.

(2) Physical objects are nothing more than their sensible qualities; Therefore,

(3) Physical objects are nothing but ideas in the mind.

The essence of this argument can be seen within Berkeley's style in section 4 of the Principles:

It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses. mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this Principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (p. 62) Berkeley's first premise is founded on his definition of the word "idea." He uses John Locke's, Essay Concerning Human Understanding as his substructure. Locke's usage is not very specific. His usage could contain many diverse meanings: sense-perceptions, bodily sensations, mental images, thoughts and concepts. This results in a lack of distinction between these very different categories. Berkeley uses the word in the same broad way.

One criticism of this argument is the charge of ambiguity (cf. Steinkraus, 1966, pp. 159- 160 [discussion of G. E. Moore's The refutation of idealism, 1903]). Berkeley fails to distinguish sensible qualities and sense-impressions. This would cast doubt on the veracity of the first premise. The first half of the First Dialogue is an attempt to establish this premise. Again, it has been asserted that Berkeley has failed to distinguish between a thing's having a certain quality and a thing seeming to a perceiver to have a certain quality. The informal fallacy then would be that of begging the question.

ARGUMENT TWO: UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS ARE MENTALLY PERCEIVED

In the Principles, Section 23, and in the First Dialogue Berkeley seeks a proof by means of the reductio ad absurdum. If one seeks to imagine books or trees existing unperceived, a perceiver must think of these unperceived objects. Berkeley argues most lucidly.

But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so [sic?], there is no difficulty in it. But what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of; which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of, or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or exist in, itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance. (pp. 69-70) Armstrong (1965) objects that this argument does not prove that physical objects cannot exist unperceived. It can prove that physical objects cannot exist unconceived. The ambiguity is Berkeley's lack of distinction between "perceiving" and "conceiving" or thinking. The problem is that the reductio ad absurdum of this reductio ad absurdum is truly absurd. The conclusion being that the only things which can exist are the things which I think of.

THE IMPLICIT ARGUMENT

The previously mentioned arguments are Berkeley's two official lines of argument for the thesis that physical objects cannot exist unperceived. There is an implicit argument not clearly outlined in his writings (Armstrong, 1965, p. 11). The argument has two steps. (1) When we perceive, the immediate object of perception is our own sense-impressions. Any other claim is an inference from what we perceive. This could be supported by the argument from illusion. For example, the drunkard has the non-veridical perception of a pink rat. However, he could just as well have veridically seen a pink rat. Therefore, the immediate object of perception is not the pink rat but one of our own sense-impressions. (2) If the immediate objects of perception are always our own sense-impressions or "ideas," two views can be taken about the physical world. (a) Locke's view that physical objects are the causes of our sense-impressions or "ideas," but exist independently of them. This is the Representative theory of perception. (b) If the Representative view is rejected the alternative is to identify the physical world with our "ideas" of it. This is Berkeley's position. Therefore, Berkeley's primary task is to disprove Locke's view, the Representative theory. At this point many historians of philosophy have praised Berkeley as being "at his philosophical best" (Armstrong, 1965; Bracken, 1966, p. 86).

CRITICISM OF LOCKE AND THE REPRESENTATIVE THEORY

Berkeley's reasoning in criticizing Locke is as follows: (1) If physical objects are never immediately perceived, but simply cause "ideas," what are we to say that physical objects are like? Are they like the ideas they cause? Locke says (along with Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Boyle) physical objects themselves have only the properties of extension, figure, motion, solidity and number. These are called primary qualities of objects. Secondary qualities such as color, sound, taste, smell, heat and cold, are our "ideas" or sense-impressions, caused in us by the action of physical objects on our senses. Locke's term for this ability is the object's "power." Berkeley gives two arguments against this primary/secondary quality division.

(a) It is impossible to conceive of a physical object without secondary qualities. If then the secondary qualities are simply "ideas," the primary qualities must also be "ideas." (b) The same arguments used for establishing the subjectivity of secondary qualities can also be applied to primary qualities. For example, we think the mite's foot is very small, but presumably she thinks it's big. An object may look tiny from a long distance.

LOCKE'S DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE

Berkeley's criticism (Principles, Sections 16-17 also in First Dialogue) of Locke's doctrine of substance can be summarized in this way. Locke's substance was "that which supports properties" or "that in which properties inhere." Locke thinks that substance is the unknown factor in physical objects which supports their properties. This is reminiscent of Anaximander's "boundless." Berkeley objects on the basis that the term "support" and "inhere" are meaningless in this context. Berkeley can find no literal or analogical sense in this usage.

In the first place, Berkeley argues that, if the immediate objects of perception are never anything but our own sense-impressions, then we can never have any good reason to believe in the existence of physical objects which cause these sense-impressions. This is developed in the Principles, Sections 18-20 and in the First Dialogue.

But what experience can we have that would support our belief in the existence of physical objects? We can never directly perceive the correlation between the having of sense-impressions of a certain sort, and the presence of physical objects of a certain sort. lf one objects that on the basis of the senses corroborating each other, (e.g., touch and sight), this only proves that those impressions are correlated in a certain way. Neither reason nor experience can provide any evidence for the existence of a physical world. The major criticism raised at this point is one of which Berkeley never shows any awareness. It is the problem of other minds. They cannot be immediately perceived: they can only be inferred. But why would this inference not also be applicable to material objects? Might there not be indirect evidence of the physical world? (Armstrong, 1965).

"IDEAS" AND PHYSICAL OBJECTS

In the Principles, Section 8, and in the First Dialogue (pp. 169-170) another argument in support of Berkeley's thesis is given. (1) We perceive qualities of an object immediately. (2) But can a physical object have this property? It cannot. According to the Representative theory physical objects cannot be immediately perceived, and so cannot have this immediately perceivable property. (3) Therefore, the same holds for other properties of our "ideas." There is, then, no resemblance between an "idea" and the physical objects. Thus, we can know nothing of the nature of physical objects.

CAUSATION AND PHYSICAL OBJECTS

The last of Berkeley's important arguments against the Representative theory, is built on his theory of causation. It is discussed in the Principles, Sections 19, 35, 30-32, 51-53, 60- 66, 102-108, and in the Second Dialogue (pp. 178-190). He argues that even if there were physical objects lying beyond our "ideas," they could never be the cause of our "ideas." His premise is that the only thing capable of causing anything is a spirit. Illustratively, one billiard-ball comes in contact with another, and the second ball moves. To say, according to Berkeley, the first billiard-ball caused the second ball to move, or made it move, is a loose way of speaking. We can find no element of agency or making in such a sequence. Only the operation of the will, as when we move our arms or legs , displays genuine agency. So, even if there were material objects beyond our "ideas," they could not bring about "ideas" in us. Here Berkeley advances one of his two new proofs of God's existence (Principles, Sections 29-30).

The first proof for God's existence is as follows: (1) Our sense-impressions are independent of our will. (2) Their cause cannot lie in ourselves and it is impossible that they be caused by matter. (3) Therefore our sense-impressions are caused by some other spirit. The "strong, lively and distinct" nature of our sense-impressions, and their "steadiness, order and coherence" sufficiently testify to the power, wisdom and benevolence of their Author.

"Sensible things do really exist: and if they exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an infinite mind, or God. This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the being of a God" (Dialogue II, p. 175).

How then does Berkeley make sense of our pool tables? According to Berkeley, when we speak of causes in nature we are simply referring to observed regularities in our sense-experience. These regularities are the effect of the goodness of God. They enable us to anticipate experience. Natural science has the purpose then of discovering and systematically describing these regularities in experience. As Copleston (1961) puts it, "There is therefore, for Berkeley an order of Nature, a system of phenomena or ideas which renders possible the construction of the natural sciences. But, as we have just seen, it is idle to look to the scientist for knowledge of the cause or causes of the existence of phenomena" (p. 239). Broad (1975) has pointed out that on this basis theoretical physics would be "the psychology of God's conative dispositions" (p. 20). Returning to the argument, it should be clear that if Berkeley's view is accepted the only possible immediate objects of perception are our own "ideas" or sense- impressions. If we also accept as valid his rejection of the Representative theory of perception, then it seems that we must accept his thesis that physical things are mere complexes of "ideas." Thus, physical objects can exist only when perceived (esse est percipi).
 

OBJECTIONS TO BERKELEY'S IMMATERIALISM

The most important difficulties are discussed by Berkeley: (1) Unobserved objects (2) The distinction between appearances and realities; (3) The nature of mind or spirit. (1) Unobserved objects Generally speaking, the average auto mechanic believes his 9-16's wrench is presently existent in the tool box apart from perceiving it. Or to put it in cliche form, does a tree even fall in the forest when no one is around? Berkeley's solutions in the Principles, Sections 3, 45, 48 and in the Second and Third Dialogues (pp. 174-176 and 193, 213-217) are as follows: He emphasizes the "perceptions" of God. "Unperceived objects" are, then, not really objects unperceived by any one at all. The infinite spirit, God, still perceives the object. Here is Berkeley's second argument for the existence of God, an entirely original one. Given Berkeley's account of the physical world, and given that physical objects do exist unperceived by any finite mind, there must be an infinite mind to perceive them. Granted, this is not likely to win any converts. According to Berkeley, when an atheist talks about unperceived objects, he is really talking about God, and so contradicting his atheism. "There is therefore some other mind [i.e., God's mind] wherein they exist during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them, as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation."

Another solution that Berkeley turns to in the problem about unobserved objects is less apparent than the appeal to God, but of more importance historically. Concerning Creation in the Third Dialogue, he says, "May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures. . . ? (pp. 215-216). His argument is concerning the meaning of unperceived objects. If somebody were to go into the study, he would perceive the table. This is a precursor of statements about unfulfilled possibilities in modern philosophy. It is classified under the name of "contrary-to-fact conditional statements" or "counter-factuals." Berkeley is suggesting that to talk about unperceived objects really means nothing more than the assertion of counter-factual statements about "ideas." This is the solution of Berkeley's philosophical descendants, the Phenomenalists (Armstrong, 1965). Phenomenalism has been called "Berkeley without God."

(2) The distinction between appearances and realities lf all our sense-experience is a matter of having "ideas," what becomes of our ordinary distinction between really perceiving something, and being under sensory illusion? Does not Berkeley's theory obliterate this distinction? In the Principles, Sections 30, 33, 36 and in the Second and Third Dialogues (pp. 178, 197 and 200-201) some discussion of this general objection is found. Things perceived by sense are to be contrasted with the "ideas" formed in the imagination. The two classes of "ideas" may be distinguished in three ways. (1) The "ideas" of sense are more vivid and clear than the "ideas" of the imagination; (2) the "ideas" of sense are being caused in us by God and not under our willful control, while imagination is controlled by will; and (3) the "ideas" of sense come to us in an orderly and coherent way but the "ideas" of imagination do not.

(3) The nature of mind or spirit.

In the mind of Berkeley, the world contains nothing besides spirits and their "ideas" (esse est percipi; esse est percipere). This community is presided over by the Master Spirit, God (Principles, Sections 2, 27, 49, 59, 135-148; Third Dialogue, pp. 193-196 and 211-212). What is the relationship between "ideas" and spirits? He then says that to speak of "ideas" being "in" the mind is simply to say that they are perceived by the mind, and that the mind or spirit itself is a simple, indivisible, spiritual substance quite distinct from its "ideas." If the mind is a spiritual substance, then "ideas" are some sort of qualification or affection of that substance.

Some probing questions need to be answered. Exactly how are "ideas" related to the spiritual substance? What is a spiritual substance anyway? The clinching critical question--is the notion any less mysterious than the unknowable substratum that Locke supposes?

In summary, Berkeley's thesis that physical objects do not exist except when perceived depends on the validity of (1) the Argument from Illusion, which must establish that the immediate objects of perception cannot be anything but "ideas"; (2) refutation of the Representative theory of perception, "ideas" are not caused in us by external physical objects.

Although I have sought to indicate some of the most crucial objections to Berkeley's key premises, his philosophy is significant. It is certainly not flawless, but is surely provocative. Steinkraus (1966), in my estimation has summarily evaluated Berkeley well. But it is doubtful if there will ever be a summary refutation of Berkeley which would someday effectively bury his ideas in the philosophical graveyard. For in spite of his failings and even errors, all the way from vacillating linguistic usage to his facile acceptance of traditional theodicy, his thought raises the kind of perennial problems that are the lifeblood of philosophy. Like Plato whom he greatly admired, he does not really give us a finished, systematic theory, flawless in detail. Instead we are given a direction and emphasis that help us attain a perspective on reality, ridding our thought of crass materialism and stimulating it to wider spiritual horizons." (p. 162)
 

A DIALOGUE IN AN UNEXPECTED PLACE

We may wonder, if Aquinas were right after all, whether George Berkeley and Alfred North Whitehead are not discussing metaphysics in purgatory. And if Aquinas were right Whitehead will be there longer than Berkeley. If so, at least in one possible world the conversation might go as follows:
 

Whitehead: It has been my aim as a philosopher to justify my speculation with the hopes of application. I prefer to see metaphysics as the flight of mallard, inwardly reflective as the poet Wordsworth and soaring toward that intellectual activity of explaining all of my experience. How is it, Bishop, that your metaphysic elucidates immediate experience?

Berkeley: The grief over which I labored was the impiousness of those developing an explanation of nature which exegeted the laws of nature but left no room for nature's God. Further, my introspection leads me to conclude that I am a thinking spirit which apprehends ideas. From this I deduce that the world is composed of things which are, in fact, what they appear to be. There is no occult material substance at their base. They are ideas.

Whitehead: But does not your own experience lead you to conclude that reality includes that which is more than mere idea, that which is physical?

Berkeley: I do believe that things exist in the qualities which I perceive--hard, heavy, knotty and warm, etc. Things are as real as ever. My contention is to dispute about that which metaphysicians seek to argue into existence, but cannot perceive. I should like to believe in those things you call physical. Only tell me what it is that you mean by "physical." What qualities are perceived in that which is physical?

Whitehead: In my immediate experience I conclude that I am able to feel and think but also that I see material substance. There are two poles to any part of reality: mental and physical.

Berkeley: I understand that you believe that each entity is dipolar and that all is both material and mental. But tell me what it is that you mean by that which is "material"?

Whitehead: Well, I should start from a more fundamental level and say that each actual entity, or that most basic or real thing is a unit of experience within the flux of reality. Again, I would depend on my immediate experience to advance the notion that the flux of things is the one ultimate generalization around which we must weave our philosophical system. The many is that multitude of occasions within time, world without end. Each entity is solidified for the moment drawing from the past entities and from those universals, or as I prefer to call them, eternal objects. Inasmuch as these events express similarity through time, they are physically apprehended. The component of change and instability is that which is mental. Those things which we perceive to be stable, such as a stone, have a component of the mental within each of the many entities from which it is made, but those non-mental aspects of the entities make up its dominant appraisal. Thus, it has a physical stability through time.

Berkeley: I see that you have successfully avoided the question. Is there not a proof to be given for that which makes up the second more immediately perceivable half of your dipolar reality? If you assert its stability as that characteristic which demonstrates materiality, I would beseech from you a more clear term for A is A and not non-A is very stable. If you would seek to use such metaphors as solid or corporeal, I would seek clarification and then demonstrate that those terms connote only ideas or sensible qualities which I do not deny. However, I still have no clear proof of that which is material or which exists apart from perception.

Whitehead: If you are asking me to give an account of matter without describing its sensible qualities, "I know not how." I do not believe in the substrata of qualities which is "I know not what." We must, if we are to give an applicable and coherent explanation of reality, start with metaphysics. No fact or perception can be self-interpretive. All that you perceive must fit within a system of thought from which it is interpreted. Now, in my metaphysic I am seeking to build a philosophy of organism in which perception and those entities we perceive are interpreted. Both you and I are not satisfied with the mechanistic cosmology. I invite

you to elucidate experience too, for I claim no finality with my system. However, I cannot accept any fundamental dualism of matter and mind, ala Descartes. Further, we agree that a cosmology of continuing substance cannot be fit into a systematic explanation since that would entail determinism. However, my conclusion from observation leads me to see physical reality as existent and not merely the idea of an infinite spirit. In my thought that infinite spirit must also be dipolar.

Bishop, you made all the right criticisms, at least in principle. I do appreciate your search for a wider basis for scientific thought.

Berkeley: I think the challenge of finding that which is material is to be laid to rest in this: "When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry

into our thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind. It is either a contradiction or an empty statement." If my argument is valid then there are only minds and their ideas left.

Whitehead: Yes, but with the extreme idealistic interpretation you are promoting--mind being the only absolute reality, and the unity of nature is the unity of ideas in the mind of God--more difficulties are raised than the previous realistic interpretation of reality. I would substitute my term "prehensive unification" for your "mind." That would give me the benefit of an explanation of perception which is subjectively relevant, the mite's foot, prehended by the mite is given an interpretation from the perspective of the unification from its standpoint. Still, good Bishop, I have learned from your intuitive refusal to accept the abstract materialism of science for "philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher."

EPILOGUE

Then it was heard in those fiery rooms, with Plato and Aristotle very near the door (Dante tells us), an antiphonal hymn. The first two lines were sung by Whitehead alone, the third and fourth by both Whitehead and Berkeley, but the final two by Berkeley alone.
 

Abide with me;
Fast falls the eventide....
Swift to its close ebbs out life's little day;
Earth's joys grow dim, its glories pass away;
Change and decay in all around I see;
O Thou who changest not, abide with me.

(Henry F. Lyte, 1847)

Armstrong, D. M. (1965). Introduction. In Berkeley's philosophical writings. (pp. 6-34). New York: Macmillan.
 

Berkeley, G. (1965). Berkeley's philosophical writings (The principles of human knowledge; Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous; Philosophical correspondence with Samuel Johnson; De Motu; An essay towards a new theory of vision; The philosophical commentaries or commonplace book). New York: Macmillan.
 

Bracken, H. M. (1966). Substance in Berkeley. In W. E. Steinkraus' (Ed.). New studies in Berkeley's philosophy. (pp. 85-97). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
 

Broad, C. D. (1975). Berkeley's argument about material substance. [Given March 25, 1942] New York: Haskell House Publishers Ltd.
 

Copleston, F. (1961). A history of philosophy: Vol. 5, Hobbes to Hume. London: Burns and Oates Ltd.

Engle, G. W. (1968). (Ed.). Berkeley's "Principles of human knowledge": Critical studies. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub.
 

Steinkraus, W. E. (1966). Berkeley and his modern critics. In W. E. Steinkraus' (Ed.). New studies in Berkeley's philosophy. (pp. 148-162). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
 

Whitehead, A. N. (1929). Process and reality. (Corrected Edition, 1978) New York: The Free Press, Macmillan Pub.

Whitehead, A. N., (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: The Free Press, Macmillan Pub.

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